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Summary: This paper by building on the general theory of the monetary circuit, proves 
that money-as a pure bank credit liability-exists to overcome constraints on required 
expenditures by firms, household and mainly the State. From this perspective the paper 
derives the employment function in the modern monetary economy. Thereby it is ex-
plained that  full employment policy is both always possible and required. It is proven 
that this conclusion holds in a perfectly open economy. Ultimately it is explained that 
there is no trade-off between full employment and sustainable price stability 
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Forewords: What is at stake? 
 
This contribution is to be read as the core of two chapters of a forthcoming book 
I am writing with Jean-Gabriel Bliek and Olivier Giovannoni, the provisional 
title being “Money creation, employment and economic stability”. It is the out-
come of a converging set of events which dismissed my previous doubts. There 
was first a conference made with Jean-Gabriel Bliek at the European Investment 
Bank (Luxembourg). It convinced me that it was possible to shake the faith of 
true policy makers in “hard-squeeze economic policy” by explaining the core 
principles of modern monetary economy as long as they are sustained by hard 
empirical studies. Next, I became aware of a converging set of criticism arising 
from economists of various denominations: the theory of the monetary circuit is 
not worth attention because it is not embodied into models; in any case they 
cannot explain what should be a sensible economic policy because they ignore 
the stock dimension and, the worse of the worse, they postulate full-employment 
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(Accoce and Mouakil 2007, Kregel 2006). The last accusations does not require 
attention since most of my previous work dealt with the explanation of unem-
ployment. I do not understand why emphasizing that money exists as it will be 
explained to remove the scarcity constraint is tantamount to a super-post walrasian 
or Says like theory. It is true that I reject the keynesian liquidity preference theory 
(I am not the only one) but only because it lacks sensible foundations in a true 
monetary economy. As for the ignorance of the “stock dimensions” and thereby of 
the role of capacity utilization, the reproach is wrong. It is impossible to analyze 
the monetary economy by only emphasizing “pure flows”. I shall restate the cru-
cial role of “stocks” and thereby net worth effects in both the explanation of un-
employment and inflation. It is crucial in the proof that there is no trade-off be-
tween full-employment and inflation. At last, the first reproach hides a deep mis-
understanding of the scientific method amid contemporary economists. It lies in 
the confusion between plausible or testable general theory and small self-isolated 
set of simultaneous mathematical equations requiring excruciating assumptions to 
be built. As such a general theory is already a model of an extremely complex 
universe, it already requires abstraction and consistency. As shown by Lindley 
(2006) in his wonderful story of modern quantum physics theory comes first mod-
els in the restricting sense after and they do not required the blithe ignorance of 
core characteristics. In a short way, I do not reject modelization in the narrow 
sense but I am not yet aware of its ability to encompass the core characteristics put 
forward by the general theory. In any case, I am stunned by the serendipity of the 
critiques relative to empirical foundations do they exist or not? 
Herein is the last resort explanation of my effort to set the record 
straights on the theory of the monetary circuit. The ultimate impulsion has been 
the empirical studies of my friend Olivier Giovannoni. Building on the 
Johansen-Juselius method of Errors correction models generalizing the co-
integration statistical methodology (Juselius 2006), he could transform the fun-
damental accounting identities on which rely modern monetary economics into 
long run relationships allowing causality analysis. His outcome are already im-
pressive, especially as it will be explained the leading role of consumption as an 
exogenous variable the perfect passive role of investment depending on con-
sumption the exogenous nature of public expenditures. It will be explained that 
they fit the full endogeneity of money for all the agents, the proposition that the 
State is not constrained by tax in its expenditures, the now obvious fully nega-
tive role of thriftiness. Such an increasing empirical support strengthens the core 
propositions, which shall be proven: without a long run full employment policy, 
sustaining the growth of consumption and State expenditures unemployment is 
to rule. There are no constraints on the State : the sole way to generate true price 
stability is to target full employment. It will be proven that there is no true for-
eign constraint and there is no trade-off between inflation and employment. 
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I/ The dynamic Process of Real Wealth generation out of Money creation 
 
To comply with the positive method I shall start with the two twin identities 
upon which the National Accounting system relies: 
 
Y= C+ I+G+E-M     1.1 
Y= W+ P+ R +T      1.2               
 
According to 1.1 the net value added or the aggregate net wealth created to 
monetary units in the accounting unit Y is always equal to the sum of aggregate 
expenditures aiming at the acquisition of domestic net output, domestic con-
sumption, domestic private investment, aggregate state expenditures and the 
trade surplus (positive, negative or null). 
According to 1.2 Y is always equal to the sum of incomes accruing to 
domestic groups the wage-bill (W), profits (P) rents or net interest R and taxes 
T. From these twin identities stems the conclusion that there are four groups 
acting in the economy firms, household, the state and the foreign sector. Their 
expenditure on the given accounting period generates Y, which is split between 
incomes accruing to the spending groups.  
As such, 1.1 and 1.2 cannot explain or unravel the process out of which 
groups spend and earn their income, they do not imply any specific causality. 
The sole way of introducing causality is to put in the front stage the monetary 
nature of the economy. To bring about the proof I shall first address an economy 
without foreign sector and next it will be proven that the proposition, the corner-
stone of the theory of the monetary circuit perfectly holds in an open economy. 
 
 
I-A/ Money creation in the simple economy as the existence condition of ex-
pectations. 
 
Each group starts with expectations: firms target their net increase in own wealth 
or profits, household target their own increase in net wealth or consumption and 
the state targets its expenditures deemed to be necessary. 
To attain those expectations each group knows that it has to undertake effective 
expenditures and thereby that it has to be endowed with the required amount of 
money. The existence condition of the modern economy is that there must be a 
specific group, the Banking sector, the role of which is to provide the spending 
groups with enough money to attain their expectations. The banking sector in-
cludes commercial banks and the central bank.  
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I-A-1  The core process of money creation 
 
Each group is to be able to ask for money to the banking system so as to fulfill 
its expectations. Let for instance Fx*, be the amount of money the group x needs 
to undertake its required expectations. It addresses its demand to a bank b part of 
the banking system. Let us assume that b endorses x expectations through a 
credit contract with x. 
As soon as x expectations are endorsed, b is committed to provide x with 
the possibility to instantaneously undertake the required expenditures. Thereby 
the endorsement generates an instantaneous debt of b, which is the amount of 
money denominated in State unit of account created for x. The counterpart is –in 
b assets side- a debt of x to be paid in the future out of future gross income of x. 
Ultimately it is straightforward that the creation of money entails three debt rela-
tionships: 
-  b debt to x 
-  x debt to b 
-  and the instantaneous spending of the money which reflects the acquisi-
tion by x of commodities and services. It is tantamount to the payment 
of the debt entailed by the transfer to x of commodities and services. 
From this analysis of the money creation process, stem the fundamental charac-
teristics of modern economy. 
1.  Money is perfectly endogenous 
2.  Money is the outcome of a balance-sheet banking operations involving 
three relationships 
3.  Money is to be defined as the banking system liabilities generating ex-
penditures aiming at the creation of real wealth. It is tantamount to the 
proposition that the counterpart of those liabilities is wealth-generating 
expenditures. 
4.  Money is destroyed (or cancelled) when initial future debts are repaid. 
Herein lies what must be deemed the fundamental law of the circulation: 
money exists to undertake required wealth-targeting expenditures It is to 
cease to exist when those expenditures are undertaken, which reflects 
that expectations are met. 
5.  Ultimately, 1 to 4 lead to the conclusion that the very notion of a de-
mand for money as an asset is inconsistent with the nature of money. It 
means that in a monetary economy money cannot be a “reserve of 
value” because it would imply that it has some “intrinsic” permanent 
value. The law of circulation imposes that money has a pure “extrinsic” 
value which is the net real wealth resulting from expenditures generating 
its creation.  
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I-A-2 Is the banking system constrained or not? 
 
1- The false constraint: the “liquidity constraint” 
1.1 As a whole banks cannot be short of “liquidity”. What is “liquidity” 
but money materializing as deposits reflecting credits endorsing expectations, 
what is deemed loans? Herein is the truth of the famous statement: “loans make 
deposits” or loans makes liquid resources”. It explains why it is not sensible to 
imagine some “banks preference for liquidity”.  
1.2 What is true is that in a multi-banks economy money exists if and 
only if there is a perfect and instantaneous convertibility of banks liabilities. 
Convertibility requirements results from the fact that a share of each bank liabili-
ties has to be converted into other banks liabilities in the course of initial debts to 
banks reimbursement. Herein lies the core role of the central bank: it issues its 
own liability, the “hard money” or “reserves” which may be converted into any 
bank liabilities without delay and at zero cost. Thereby banks can always borrow 
reserves whatever the mechanism to ensure the convertibility of their liabilities. 
They pay an interest to the Central Bank but they cannot be “quantity con-
strained” by the Central Bank in a fully monetarized economy. 
1.3 In a multi-forms of money economy, the Central Bank ensures the 
permanent convertibility between all the forms of money; let us say banks de-
posits and Central Bank or State notes. A share of deposit being converted into 
notes, banks need for reserves to sustain convertibility. The Central bank is 
thereby obliged to meet banks need for reserves to prevent a failure in the con-
vertibility process, which would jeopardize the very existence of money. Let us 
emphasize this outcome because it has been strongly debated.  
Banks cannot be “quantity constrained” by the Central Bank because it would 
contradict the very principle of endogeneity of money. “Reserves constraints” 
would deprive banks liabilities of the nature of money. 
 
 
2- The true constraint: the net wealth or profit constraint 
 
  2.1 It has first a “negative aspect”. Banks are constrained by the expecta-
tions of spending groups. It means that money cannot be created “ex nihilo” 
since it is the outcome of required expenditures targeting increase in real wealth. 
Herein lies the true meaning of the endogeneity principle and the demise of any 
notion of the “supply of money or credit”. In a monetary economy, the quantity 
of money created at time t is identical to the effective demand addressed to the 
banks. 
  2.2 It has secondly a “positive aspect”. Commercial banks whatever are 
private firms targeting the growth of their net wealth (or capital) out of their net 
profits. Banks net profits are equal to their gross profits minus what is distrib-Alain Parguez 
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uted to stockholders. They are invested into financial assets sold by debtors to 
finance their interest bill. In the modern monetary economy, banks are obliged to 
maintain “capital ratios” monitored by Central banks, which reinforces their 
profit constraint. There are two sources of banks profits, net interest income, the 
long-run component
1, and capital gains (positive, negative or nil) generated by 
fluctuations of the money value of banks assets. The profit constraint has two 
consequences: 
-It explains both the existence of the rate of interest and its level. The Central 
bank own rate is the root of the rate of interest (or the set of rates) imposed on 
debtors because the crucial cost of banks is the cost of Central Bank ultimate 
liquidity. For a given targeted growth of their net worth banks apply to this pri-
mary or fundamental cost a multiplier (or a set of multiplier) reflecting their 
required average rate of profit. Herein lies the full exogenity of the rate of inter-
est as a pure policy parameter. The empirical proof is provided by Galbraith, 
Giovannoni and Russo (2007) for the American economy. On one side the base 
rate reflects the sole exogenous decision of the Federal Reserve Board led by 
political motives. On the other side, all interest rates are led, with some lag, by 
the Central Bank own rate.  
-It also explains the credit worthiness norms imposed by banks on debtors. Tak-
ing care of the uncertainty factor (the unknowability of the future) banks strive 
to prevent failure of expectations, which would generate capital losses or lower 
capital gains. The profit constraint explains why the so-called “credit rationing” 
is perfectly consistent with full endogeneity of money. 
 
 
I-B/ All spending agents have access to money but not on equal terms 
 
A fundamental distinction is to be drawn between the Private Sector and the 
State 
 
I-B-1 The Private sector is constrained 
 
1.  It is true for firms. Firms may finance all their required expenditures, 
wages and salaries (and pensions) and investment and interest out of 
money creation. There is not the least reason to exclude investment 
without contradicting the very nature and definition of money. It means 
that the whole amount of money created for firms account is not neces-
sarily to be destroyed in the same accounting period. According to the 
law of circulation investment loans are to be repaid out of future profits 
generated by this addition to equipment. It does not contradict the im-
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possibility of a reserve of value motive. Assuming that firms recoup 
more money than they have to pay back does not imply any demand for 
money function. These monetary profits are to be recycled in the next 
production process, which endows them again with real value
2. 
In any case, firms’ access to money is constrained both by their long-run 
profits expectations and by banks ability to believe in those expectations. 
Herein the crucial role of profits expectations is put in the front stage; 
the existence condition of the system lies in the attempt to find anchors 
to those expectations (Giovannoni 2006; Giovannoni and Parguez 
2007a). Profits expectations are derived from the accounting coming 
from 1 and 2 
P= ( C + I + G) – ( W + R +T)  3.1 
P= C + I + (G-T) – (W + R)      3.2 
 
Where P accounts just for effective or earned profits abstracting from 
cyclical capital gains. To go further one needs to search for long-run an-
chors and thereby for exogenous components framing firms (and banks) 
judgement. It has been proven by Giovannoni and Parguez (op cit) and 
mainly by Giovannoni (2006 b) for the American economy from 1954 to 
2006 that G is exogenous both in the short and in the long run. It means 
that the growth rate of G is one anchor of expected growth of profits. T 
is partly exogenous and the growth of T has a negative impact on ex-
pected profits. The anchor role of G means that firms are certain that the 
State will not strive to compensate the growth of G by higher taxation as 
long as there is not enough compensation from an other anchor. Herein 
lies an explanation of the positive role of State deficits as it will be 
proven. 
-C is also exogenous relative to all incomes and other expenditures and 
it has the strongest positive impact on profits mainly in the long run. It 
leads to the long run consumption relationship: 
 
Ct*= Wt + dDh  3.3 
 
Where dDh is the net increase in household indebtness to banks match-
ing the lack of income to meet the consumption target. Ct* enshrines 
household long-run expectations of the growth of their real worth (or 
well being) it includes housing expenditures. The consumption identity 
embodies the fact that dividend and net interest are a rather insignificant 
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part of household income in the modern monetary economy. 3.3 reflects 
the twin structural aspects of the modern monetary economy especially 
in its American avatar. Instead of the erstwhile version of a capital ac-
cumulation driven society there is a consumption-driven society which is 
“also a Public Expenditures driven society” as shown by Galbraith 
(2006) and Bliek and Parguez (2006, 2007). 3.3 leads to the generalized 
profit identity: 
 
 P= ( I+ dDh + g) – R    g accounting for the budget deficit. 
 
-I in the long run is strongly endogenous being entirely determined by 
consumption. Such a causality unravels a “dynamic long-run accelera-
tion factor” (Giovannoni 2006a). To the contrary I does not depend on 
profits, whatever the Profits variable. It displays the role of the capacity 
effect, which can therefore be part of the model of the monetary econ-
omy. The long run causal relationship implies the existence of a long run 
rate of utilization of equipment while cyclical fluctuations are the out-
come of short-run errors in expectations raising the rate of utilization 
above or below its normal level. 
-Ultimately, R the net interest income is both exogenous and endowed 
with a strong negative impact on profits. Such an outcome is perfectly 
sensible because R can be defined as banks net profit which is a drain on 
firms net worth (directly or indirectly through the levy on the other 
agents). It accounts for the net saving leakage. As already proven in the 
long-run the growth of R is pure policy factor so that the ratio of R to Y, 
n, is to be a pure exogenous parameter. 
 
From this analysis stems the conclusion that firms expectations are ulti-
mately anchored into the growth of consumption (positive impact out of 
the direct effect and the accelerator effect), the growth of public expen-
diture (positive impact) and the growth of the Rentier income (negative 
impact). 
 
2.  Contrary to a widespread assumption, household have access to money 
to attain their long-run expectations. It is the existence condition of the 
exogeneity of consumption growth. Household increase their stock of 
debt because they are certain that they could meet their increased future 
commitments (interest plus debt reimbursement) out of the growth of 
their future income generated by their increased expenditures
3. Such a 
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bet on the far future is successful as long as it fits firms own long-run 
expectations. It means that ultimately household are constrained by 
firms’ expectations and banks expectations of firms response to house-
hold-generated profits. 
I-B-2 The State is not constrained 
 
Contrary to the private sector, the State is not constrained. On one side, the State 
undertakes all it expenditures out of money creation. As soon as the State de-
cides to spend for services or commodities, the treasury sends a cheque to the 
private seller who deposits it at his (her) bank. There is an instantaneous increase 
in the quantity of money, the counterpart being in banks assets a claim on the 
State. State expenditures generates an instantaneous creation of money reflecting 
an automatic credit (or loans) of banks to the State. From this core mechanism, 
stems the fact that taxes cannot finance State outlays, they just cancel or destroy 
an equal amount of money when they are raised. Understanding that the State 
does not finance its expenditure by its tax revenue is the Sine Qua Non, the Ul-
timate cornerstone of the positive theory of the modern economy. The proposi-
tion holds whatever the relationship between the Central Bank and the State. In 
the American Payment System, the counterpart of automatic banks credit is an 
increase in banks reserves while tax payments destroy reserves. In the Euro 
payment System, taking care of the abolition of links between States and the 
Central Bank State expenditures do not lead to an automatic increase in reserves. 
In any case, banks are to spend their non interest bearing liquid claims on the 
State or the Central Bank to acquire interest bearing bonds. It leads to the fact 
that the State cannot be constrained by the so-called demand for bonds. There is 
a robust empirical proof of the proposition that taxes cannot finance and there-
fore constrain State expenditures. The proof is straightforward. It has been 
proven that State expenditures are exogenous relative to all private variables. 
Were G constrained by the tax revenue it would not be true because the tax 
revenue is not fully exogenous. Thereby G is not financed by taxes. 
On the other side, exogeneity means that G being not constrained by 
taxes the State is free to determine its deficit, the excess of G over taxes. It can-
not be constrained either by private expectations or by banks profit expectations 
contrary to firms and household. Herein lies the ultimate or last resort anchor of 
the growth of State expenditures for private   and  banks  long-run  expecta-
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I-C/ The anchor role of the State deficit and public debt 
 
I-C-1  For each group one may define its accounting deficit (or negative net 
saving) as the excess of its aggregate expenditures over its receipts. Thereby g, 
Df, Dh, Sf, Sh, Sr being the State deficit, firms deficit, household deficit, firms 
net saving, household net saving and banks net savings. From 3.3 we derive the 
fundamental identity: 
 
P-I= Sf= g+dDh-Sr  (4) 
 
Assuming for a while that household turn into net savers to strive to fund their 
pensions, in 4 instead of dDh we have Sh 
 
Sh= -dDh   (5) 
 
Thereby the generalized accounting identity becomes 
 
Sf= g- Sh – Sr   (6) 
g= Se + Sh + Sr= Sp  (7) 
 
Sp being aggregate net saving of the private sector as whole 
From (7) stem crucial conclusions 
1.  As already proven in 7 the causal factor is the State deficit. 7 means that 
the State deficit automatically creates an equal amount of saving in the 
private sector. 
2.  7 unravels the true Trade-off in the monetary economy (Bliek and Par-
guez 2007). For a given amount of expected profit, there is a inverse re-
lationship between g and Sh. The more the State decides to curb its defi-
cit the more households have to squeeze their saving and turn into net 
debtors. Inversely the more household decide to save (being afraid of the 
future) the more the State has to run its deficit to “save” firms net prof-
its. Any attempt to curb the State deficit crowds out household savings 
or (and) firms net savings. 
3.  Ultimately, State “negative saving” is the existence condition for an ef-
fective increase in net wealth of the whole private sector. It explains 
why the State cannot be constrained by banks for deficit and thereby 
why it is free to determine its expenditures. 
4.  A State positive saving (or surplus) has the inverse effect. It reflects a 
fall in the private sector net wealth as a whole. 
 
I-C-2 As already shown, contrary to a wide spread opinion, the State is not 
obliged to sell bonds to finance its deficit. The truth is that bonds sale is just an Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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offsetting operation substituting in banks assets Treasury bonds earning interest 
for excess reserves or liquidity earning no interest. From this fact stems the so-
called “constraint on the Public Debt”.There would be an exogenous limit of the 
Public Debt because of the burden or drain it imposes on the private economy! 
Such a drain cannot exist in a true monetary economy. 
1.  According to identity 7, the growth of public debt is the counterpart of 
an increase in private net wealth (or a decrease in private net debt). Such 
a positive wealth effect operates in two ways: it compensates for depres-
sions induced by firms errors of expectations, this anti-cyclical effect is 
very strong in the USA as shown by Giovannoni (2006a) and Eisner 
(1994); on the other side it provides firms with enough net profits to 
strengthen their positive expectations by adjusting them to household 
own ones. Firms may always bet on the required deficit to match nega-
tive factors (fall in household growth of indebtness, increased banks fear 
of expectations failures). 
2.  Interest on the public debt is the bulk of the net interest income R. 
Thereby interest paid by the State is the main source of banks net profits 
in the long run ( by abstracting from capital gains). For a given banks 
profit constraint, State interest payment must soften the creditworthiness 
norms imposed on private debtors. 
3.  In any case as already proven the rate of interest on bonds is entirely de-
termined by monetary policy. The study of Galbraith, Giovannoni and 
Russo (op cit) is straightforward: the bonds rate adjusts very quickly and 
positively to the Central Bank own rate. If policy makers are truly wor-
ried by the “burden” the ratio R to Y  they must always maintain the rate 
on bonds quite below the rate of growth. 
4.  Finally, as shown first by Domar (1949) and next by Eisner (1994) for a 
dynamic economy like the USA, the State deficit accounts for public in-
vestment tangible and not tangible. The counterpart of the growth of the 
public debt in the State capital accounts is an increase in real assets pro-
viding the society with an increase in its real wealth. There is a “public 
wealth effect” which reinforces the direct private wealth effect. It sus-
tains the growth of firms expected profits because they always bet on 
more buoyant household expectations while reinforcing household con-
fidence in the future, which strengthens the role of macro-economic pol-
icy as the adjustment factor of private expectations. 
5.  1 to 4 are enough to explain that there cannot be a “reimbursement con-
straint” in a dynamic monetary economy. The amount of money re-
ceived from the State (as a part of aggregate expenditures) to redeem 
matured bonds is to be reinvested automatically in new bonds. 
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I-D  The Generalization to the open economy: there is no foreign con-
straint? 
 
Since its inception, one of the most widespread objection to the positive theory 
of money has been that it could only hold in a close economy. What is at stake is 
thereby the famous “foreign constraint”. 
 
I-D-1 What is exactly that “foreign constraint” 
 
Over time, two aspects of the constraint have been emphasized the “liquidity 
shortage” and the “twin deficits theorem”. For the sake of simplicity, I assume 
that there are two countries the domestic economy d and the foreign economy F, 
each with its own currency md and mf, z being the price of a unit of md into mf, 
the exchange rate. 
 
Let B be the trade deficit of d denominated in md units. 
 
1.  According to the core principle of the monetary economy d banks have 
created B units of d to meet the net acquisition of F commodities and 
services by d agents, F firms get B units of d as deposits in d banks, they 
instantaneously ask for their conversion in F currency. Herein would lie 
the “liquidity constraint”: B has been determined for some level of z, z°; 
d banks cannot meet banks conversion requirement; they have to borrow 
“reserves” in F to the Central bank but how could the Central bank get 
enough reserves. Ultimately, default is expected, leading to a collapse of 
the exchange rate accounting for the widespread cumulative failure of 
expectations. The lesson of this catastrophic scenario is obvious: the 
State in d is strongly constrained by the amount of owned foreign cur-
rency reserves. It has to put harsh limit on the access to money creation! 
Ultimately, in the open economy, money is no more endogenous, the 
monetary circuit theory holds no more! 
2.  The “twin deficit theorem” relies on two postulates: 
–Any state deficit generates a trade deficit 
-The trade deficit is equal to the budget deficit 
 
I-D-2 Neither the “liquidity constraint” nor the “twin deficit theorem” hold in a 
true monetary economy 
 
1.  The story relies on one (not always explicit assumption): a fixed ex-
change-rate at a pure exogenous level. To comply with these self-
imposed constraints, the Central bank is obliged to ensure the conver-
sion of any amount of the d currency at a fixed price. Let us drop this as-Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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sumption, which does not fit the core principle of the monetary economy 
because the role of the State is to minimize constraints on expectations 
and not to enforce a constraint contradicting the very nature of money, 
which is absolute endogeneity. 
Thereby to ensure the conversion d banks have just to buy F currency to 
F banks at the agreed price or exchange rate. F banks are to provide all 
the F currency amount at the price, which fits their expectations. At this 
price, d banks get the required amount of foreign currency, which mate-
rializes as an increase in F banks deposits. The counterpart in their assets 
side is deposits in de banks in d currency. Finally, the existence condi-
tion of B is an automatic financing reflecting the creation of money in 
both d and F. The theory of the monetary circuit perfectly holds. As long 
as B is greater than expected, such an automatic financing of B is to re-
quire a fall in x (depreciation) relative to its former level. 
Bankruptcy or just default cannot happen in a floating exchange-rate 
system out of cumulative depreciation reflecting a flight from the cur-
rency. 
2.  The two postulates of the twin deficits theorem are “invalid” relative to 
empirical facts as shown for instance by Bliek and Parguez (2007a) for 
three reasons: 
-It is rare to observe both a budget deficit and a trade deficit 
-When they simultaneously exist, the trade deficit is not equal to the 
budget deficit 
-Looking closely at the USA case from 1954 to 2006, one must doubt 
the conventional causality going from the budget deficit to the trade 
deficit. The inverse could be true: the causality could go from the trade 
deficit to the budget deficit. It would mean that the trade deficit depends 
on factors exogenous relative to the impact of the budget deficit on ag-
gregate demand in the like of the exchange rate and the structure of do-
mestic production. In such a case, the budget deficit plays the part of a 
compensatory factor offsetting the impact of the trade deficit on aggre-
gate demand. 
 
Thereby the fundamental identity 7 can be generalized. From the twin ac-
counting identities: 
 
Y= C+I+G-B                      
Y=W+P+R+T 
 
One derive the generalized profit identity 
 
P=I+dDh+G-B  (8) Alain Parguez 
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With B=Sf   (9) 
 
Sf being the foreign saving (net profits) reflecting the trade deficit accounted 
in d currency units. From 8 and 9 stems the ultimate accounting identity 
 
G= Sd+Sf= Se+Sh+Sr+Sf  (10) 
 
I leads to the following conclusion proving that the theory of the monetary 
circuit is truly germane to the modern monetary economy. 
 
-It is grossly wrong to believe that the deficit country needs foreign saving 
to finance its deficit. The trade deficit is genuine net saving for the foreign 
country and therefore it generates net wealth. What is true is that F banks in-
vest their deposits in income-earning assets in the d country, usually treasury 
bonds. Assuming that the budget deficit is not high enough to provide new 
bonds, the d Central bank has to sell bonds to foreign banks to prevent a rise 
in bonds price and therefore a fall in the interest rate that would change the 
yield-curve targeted by the Central bank. One has to emphasize that the cor-
nerstone of a positive theory of the monetary economy is the couple of the 
two crucial propositions or theorems: 
-first, the State cannot be constrained in its expenditures because it has free 
access to money. 
-last, the trade deficit cannot absorb pre-existing saving 
 
-The budget deficit allows the creation of net saving for both the domestic 
economy and the foreign sector. Assuming that the trade deficit is exoge-
nous, the State has to run a deficit large enough to provide the domestic sec-
tor with enough net wealth to sustain long-run dynamic expectations. 
Thereby ultimately, it is always true that the budget deficit must be a policy 
parameter in a dynamic economy like the USA. This conclusion perfectly 
applies to the French case in 1983. As already shown by Eisner (1983) and 
fully documented by Bliek and Parguez (2008), the dramatic turn in the Mit-
terrand Administration policy was the outcome of a pure choice rooted into a 
deeply conservative economic ideology. 
 
3.  It is at last time to tell the true French story Eisner (1983) strived to 
warn against the veil of self-justifying rhetoric but so strong was the de-
sire to believe in the foreign constraint that it was ignored and it is still 
ignored (Bliek and Parguez 2008). 
 
The story would be true if two conditions were met: the French U-turn was 
forced on a despaired government; in the long run it has been a success. Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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None is true! In spring 1981, France was still bleeding out of shock therapy 
of the Raymond Barre deflation program decided in September 1976. An 
arch-conservative economist inspired by Hayek and his French disciple 
Rueff, a perfect apostle of the French Economic Ideology (Bliek and Par-
guez 2006, 2007b). Barre purpose was to save a fixed-exchange rate of the 
French franc relative to Deutsch mark and the US dollar reflecting a strong 
appreciation (the so-called strong currency principle). The result was catas-
trophic: collapse of consumption, induced drop in investment, rise in unem-
ployment and lack of confidence in the currency leading the government to 
engineer speculation by borrowing US dollars through the veil of State com-
panies and high interest rates. 
Contrary to a widespread belief, as shown by Eisner (1983), Bliek and 
Parguez (2006) the early outcome of the reflation policy of the socialist-led 
government was a success. The twin deficits theorem did not hold. Net prof-
its started to rise again, consumption rose which sustains the increase in net 
investment, unemployment started to decrease. Thereby it is not true that the 
State deficit increase generated an equal trade surplus, which would have 
prevented any positive impact on the economy. What is true is that the new 
government remained enslaved to the Strong Currency Principe and there-
fore rejected the very idea of a devaluation. The outcome was a drain of re-
serves foreign currencies, the compounded effect of the trade deficit and the 
“flight from the currency” reflecting the liquidation by foreign holders of 
French assets. This accelerated capital outflow had been triggered by the 
widespread expectation of a strong devaluation (15 to 20%).  
By its own choice, the government had put itself at a crossroad: either 
save the exchange rate by renouncing the modest New Deal or save the 
economy by renouncing the hard currency principle. 
The first way was chosen! A new long run shock therapy deflation 
plan was imposed for at least five years. For the first time since 1945, a gov-
ernment explicitly decided to force a rise in unemployment out of the tar-
geted harsh squeeze of aggregate demand both public expenditures and 
mainly consumption. I do think that the Mitterrand shock therapy has no 
equivalent elsewhere (abstraction from IMF adjustment programs) but the 
shock therapy imposed on Russia in the early nineties. 
The outcome was catastrophic both in the short-run and in the long 
run. The government was finally obliged to devalue the currency and, next, 
had to increasingly reinforce the shock therapy to freeze the exchange rate. 
As shown by Bliek and Parguez (2006) the French economy (and society) 
never recovered from the strait jacket in which it was jailed. From 1983 on-
wards, expectations turned more and more pessimistic both for firms and 
household and for banks themselves. Alain Parguez 
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Ultimately, there remains a question: why did the French government 
by its own will and without any remorse took the deflation avenue without 
any opposition? Again, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the so-called 
experts who framed the economy policy had never been “Keynesians”. 
Jacques Attali, the leading economic advisor and his team as soon as the  
mid seventies had embraced a weird neo-Marxist version of the ruling 
French Economic Ideology, mixing Hayek, Rueff, a crude ultra-ricardian 
Marxism (Bliek and Parguez 2007b, 2008) extolling the virtue of thriftiness 
to attain in the very long run the perfect rational capitalist economy. They 
approved the purpose of the Barre deflation but they believed that the plan 
was too soft to meet its target. Herein was the long run agenda requiring a 
strong growth of investment out of the growth of profit. Led by their ricar-
dian-agrarian vision of Marxism, they ignored the profit identity and thereby 
targeted a dramatic fall in the labour share to raise profits.  
For political reasons, the Government had to reflate but as soon as 
possible the New Deal should be abandoned, the opportunity was the ex-
change rate crisis. In its obsessional fight to abide by the hard currency prin-
ciple the socialist administration complied with the Rueff postulate: a strong 
currency is to be imposed to attain the long run equilibrium. The ultimate 
explanation of the shock therapy turn was the dream of European monetary 
unification requiring fixed exchange rates. 
The conclusion is straightforward: the French lesson is teaching the 
truth of the Monetary Circuit theory core principle! 
 
 
II/ The explanation of unemployment: the false trade-off between Un-
employment and inflation 
 
II-A What is unemployment? 
 
II-A-1 It accounts for individuals who cannot find a job providing them with 
the monetary income fitting the consumption long run expectations. Unem-
ployment is thereby encompassing: 
-those who are officially without income generating job 
-those who are forced to live on the so-called social minimum whatever 
-those who are forced to retire before the legal retirement age 
-at least those obliged to survive on marginal incomes out of part-time jobs, 
… 
 
Such an encompassing definition leads to the notion of under-employment 
or waste of the labour force. It helps to discover the true and dramatic im-
pact of unemployment especially when one strives to compare dynamic eco-Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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nomics like the USA to non-dynamic societies like the Euro Zone and espe-
cially France. According to Mishel, Bernstein and Allegreto (2007 in their 
last edition of “the State of Working America”, p. 230.) in the USA the rate 
of underemployment varies exactly like the official rate, the ratio being 
rather constant (around 2/1). It means that the official rate being strongly 
anti-cyclical, the same is true for the rate of underemployment. As shown by 
Bliek and Parguez (2006, Giovannoni and Parguez (2007b) in France the ef-
fective rate of unemployment, taking care of the increasing situations of hid-
den unemployment, never stopped to rise relative to the official rate at least 
since the late seventies. It reflects what has been deemed the “social therapy 
of unemployment” which became official long term policy in 1983 when the 
Government officially targeted on increase in unemployment. Today, the di-
vergence is more striking than ever as shown by Table 1 measures in per-
centage of the potentially working population: 
 
    USA  (2006)     France  (2006) 
Official rate 
Of  unemployment   4.7%            10% 
 
Rate of underemployment  8,5%            at least 36% 
or effective rate of 
unemployment 
 
Contrary to the USA, there has been in France a long-run growth of effective 
unemployment (from around 1967 onwards) reflecting both the rise in offi-
cial unemployment and the accelerated growth of disguised unemployment 
under the cover of the “Social therapy” (Parguez and Giovannoni, 2007b).  
 
II-A-2 From this definition one must derives three propositions leading to three 
explanation of unemployment: 
 
1.  Unemployment only exists because firms decide to pay a labour income 
which is inferior to the level that would exempt household from ration-
ing in their long run consumption expectations. Let W
0 be this level re-
flecting that must be deemed full-employment, unemployment exists if 
and only if W the effective amount of labour income reflecting long-run 
expectations is lower than W
0. Such a definition does not contradict the 
access of household to money. Household do not feel constrained as 
long as in the long run they expect that W is to be adjusted to W
0, or 
rather that the growth rate of W fits the growth rate of W
0. 
2.  In a positive monetary economy, there cannot be a supply of labour 
curve because earning an income is a constraint and not a choice. It is Alain Parguez 
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enough to dismiss he dubious notion of a “labour market” and thereby 
all explanations of unemployment in terms of supply of labours rigidi-
ties. Stockhammer (2004) provides a robust empirical proof of the in-
existence of these “rigidities” as the cause of long-run rise in unem-
ployment in Europe. 
3.  There cannot be a trade-off between the level of real employment L in 
labour-unit and the money wage rate, W. Household long run expecta-
tions being motivated by the growth of desired consumption expendi-
tures, is the exogeneous driving variable for their desire for income. It 
determines both the desired or required growth of employment and the 
required rate of the wage rate or base unit income. In an economy where 
employment is directly under the control of firms, the wage-rate plays a 
role of some last resort anchor of household expectations. Herein lies the 
relative long run exogeneity of the effective growth rate of the wage rate 
(Giovannoni, 2006a). It means that attempts to prevent a fall in the 
growth of w are perfectly sensible and operate convergence whatever. 
 
 
II-B The Employment function 
 
The existence condition of unemployment in the monetary economy is that the 
effective labour  income W is entirely determined by firms according to their 
own expectations endorsed by banks, while the required or full-employment 
labour income is entirely determined by household long-run expectations. 
 
II-B-1 Let P(e,t) and r* be expected profits for t and the required rate of profit 
defined as the ratio of expected profits to labour income, the employment func-
tion is: 
Wt= 1/r* P(e,t)   (11) 
 
It displays the following characteristics: 
 
II-B-2 1/r* plays the role of the employment multiplier to be substituted in a 
monetary economy for the Keynesian multiplier. It answers the question firms 
have to raise in the context of an absolute unknowability of the far future. Tak-
ing care of their short run expected profits, what must be the level of employ-
ment and thereby output fitting those expectations. The more they are confident 
in the future without reversal of expectations the higher is to be employment. It 
means that firms fear expectations failure leading them with excess capacity in 
terms of labour requiring costly employment reduction and generating capital 
losses because of the induced excess capacity of equipment. In their effort to 
meet their profits expectations banks are to include the r* factor in their credit-Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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worthiness norms. Since r* embodies firms and banks ability to bet on the future 
and doing so fight with unknowability, r* is to be a constant over time as long as 
there is not a dramatic reversal in the shared “vision” of the future. 
 
II-B-3 As already shown, profits expectations depend on expected growth of 
consumption and expected growth of public expenditures. Minimizing expecta-
tions failures requires an adjustment of household and firms expectations. Herein 
lies what must be deemed the true “dynamic virtuous process” of the monetary 
economy: access to money of household leads firms to legitimate household 
expectations by providing them with the required income out of their own ex-
pectations of consumption.  Let r° be this rate of profit fitting private adjustment 
of expectations; r° is the rate of profit fitting full employment. The existence 
condition of such an adjustment is the growth rate of public expenditures, the 
ultimate anchor of the whole set of expectations. It must be high enough and 
stable enough to lead firms to be more and more optimistic about the future, 
which may lower r* until it attains its full employment level r°. 
 
II-B-4 Ultimately the employment multiplier is an exogenous variable deter-
mined by the State, fiscal policy playing the dominant role. This conclusion 
perfectly holds in the open economy since the State through its deficit may com-
pensate for the negative impact on expectations of the trade deficit. 
From the determination of r* stems the share of profits m*, since 
 
With R=nY  (12) 
m*= P/Y= (1-n) r*/1+r*   (13) 
 
m* is determined by fiscal policy for a given monetary policy controlling l. 
Herein lies the generalization of the crucial discovery of Kalecki, this distinction 
between the amount of profits and the share of profits: 
-There exists a required share of profits m
* which is strictly exogenous because 
it is policy determined. It means that the effective share of profits m fluctuates 
around the m
* level. Exogeneity reflects the unknowability of the future effect-
ing expectations in a monetary economy. It has nothing to do with the “degree of 
monopoly”, the “state of competion” which had been emphasized by Kalecki as 
the main determinant of m
*. 
-In the short run both profits variables are independent. 
-As already emphasized by Kalecki any attempt to raise the share of profits sus-
tained by a misleading policy is to decrease the labour income and thereby con-
sumption. The drop in expected profits is to generate a fall in expected profits 
out the sustained fall in effective profits. 
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II-B-5 We are led to the conclusion that in the monetary economy unemploy-
ment is both the “natural state” and always and fully “involuntary”. It is “natu-
ral” because without a proper and long-run macro-economic policy household 
expectations will never be adjusted to firms and banks expectations.  Together 
firms and commercial banks expectations are unable to frame the optimistic 
vision of the future meeting household expectations. By its very nature, unem-
ployment is involuntary because it embodies the rationing of household.  
To curb unemployment, there is again no trade-off between L and w, 
whatever the mechanism of the trade-off, drop in the growth rate of w paid to 
jobholder or social therapy “à la française” (the so-called ‘French model’). It 
means that the labour income generated by the employment function generates a 
unique couple w, L). A drop in the effective income unit (or its growth rate) 
relative to productivity is to engineer cumulative and strongly negative wealth 
effects. It is enough to dismiss once for all the so-called “Keynes effect”. 
 
 
II-C The False trade-off between Employment and Inflation 
 
II-C-1 A tragic story 
 
I agree with Galbraith-Darity ( 2005) and Parker (2005  ) interpretation of the 
demise of mainstream Keynesianism and the failure of all heterodox schools to 
debunk new mainstream macro-economics whatever. All of them since the start 
embraced and still embrace the postulate that there is a trade-off between infla-
tion and full-employment. Endorsing the Phillips curve was a recipe for disaster; 
it could not make sense of the so-called “stagflation”. It initiated the whole 
NAIRU debate and led to the conclusion that whatever the explanation there was 
an inflation barrier to full employment policies. Herein is the origin of attempts 
to remove the Barrier by imposing the so-deemed “income policy”, the genuine 
“wage-policy” (if not wage-police) to get rid of the threat of the “Unions men-
ace”. There were very few dissenters to the Trade-off consensus like Eisner 
(Parker op cit) in the USA and Jean de Largentaye in France (Bliek and Parguez 
2006) but they are still ignored and the trade-off consensus rules. 
 
II-C-2  It is time to doubt the Trade-off which is contradicting the whole positive 
theory of the monetary economy. Such an effort came to my mind because of a 
crucial discovery by  Olivier Giovannoni (2007b ) Studying the relationship for 
the USA from 1954 to 2006 between inflation and the rate of unemployment he 
found that there may exist a very stable and perfectly positive relationship be-
tween inflation and unemployment. He relies on official measures of unem-
ployment but, as already proven they make sense for the USA. The relationship 
seems to be a long run one taking the form of a cointegration straight line explic-Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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itly showing that decrease (increase) in the rate of inflation is associated with 
decrease (increase) in the rate of unemployment without any significant thresh-
old. As such it is enough to dismiss once for all the trade-off and the NAIRU 
whatever. 
Applying long-run causality tests leads to what could be a puzzling con-
clusion: causality goes from a drop in inflation to a drop in the rate of unem-
ployment. Couldn’t be some comfort to the European Central bank? Not the 
least because other long run causality tests prove without any ambiguity that 
employment is strongly led by growth and that growth is led by the exogenous 
demand variables, consumption and public expenditures which reflects the long 
run commitment of the State to full employment. From this twin causality rela-
tionship I draw a tentative explanation of the Giovannoni straight line. It unveils 
an inverse long run causal relationship between the growth of aggregate demand 
sustained by the State long run policy and long run expected inflation. It is 
rooted into the following process: the more firms are led to expect a sustained 
growth of aggregate demand the more they are led to expect a long run drop in 
expected inflation; thereby to meet or realize those expectations they have to 
increase output and employment. To sum up it is true that an expected drop in 
inflation requires an effective increase in employment which accounts for the 
fall in the rate of unemployment.  
 
II-C-3 What remains is to explain why the inverse long run causality between 
the growth of aggregate demand and inflation is perfectly germane to the mone-
tary economy described by the theory of the monetary circuit.  
Let p and a be respectively in each period the unit price of aggregate private 
domestic output and the average productivity of labour, it leads to the price iden-
tity 
 
paL=Y   (14) 
 
in which p accounting for the average of production domestic prices whatever, 
reflects the required price determined by firms to attain their profits expecta-
tions. Firms have to fix a price allowing them to recoup as receipts or value (Y) 
the sum of their expected costs and required profits. 
 
Costs have two components in a monetary economy: 
-the income component encompassing the wage bill and for reasons already 
explained the net interest income. 
-the capital losses J generated by a rate of equipment utilization below its normal 
rate reflecting the full employment level. Let j be the rate of expected J to real 
output. 
 Alain Parguez 
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The operational price identity becomes 
 
paL= wL (1+r*) (1+n) + J    (15.1) 
p= w/a (1+r*) (1+n) + j         (15.2) with j = J/aL 
 
The impact of imports and thereby of the exchange-rate does not explicitly ap-
pears because it is already included in the J, j components. n and r* being ex-
ogenous policy parameters of which changes generate only a once for all shocks, 
from the price identity stems the fact that there can be only two cause of infla-
tion, a sustained increase in unit labour cost w/a and a non-compensated increase 
in j. 
Let us assume henceforth a state long run macro economic policy target-
ing full employment and therefore stabilizing  r* and n at their full employment 
levels r
0 and n
0. What can be its impact on the two potential causes of inflation. 
 
1. The first is the long-run rise in j: j varies positively with the excess of the 
excess of the normal rate of equipment utilization over its effective rate. There is 
a perfect correlation between the rate of equipment utilization and the rate of 
unemployment, the first always falls when the second rises as documented by 
Galbraith (1998   ) and authors of “the State of Working America” (op cit). It 
leads to the notion of “global capacity” (Giovannoni 2006) which excludes fac-
tors substitution at the macro economic level. The normal rate of equipment 
utilization reflects therefore full employment of the labour force while the excess 
of the normal rate over the effective rate reflects the rate of unemployment. 
It is perfectly sensible to assume that j varies always positively with the 
rate of unemployment. The conclusion is straightforward: 
-A rise in the rate of unemployment causes a rise in j and therefore infla-
tion 
-A policy targeting full employment is to generate a drop in j which gets 
rid a cause of inflation 
 
Since the effective rate of unemployment reflects the discrepancy between the 
effective growth of labour-income and its full employment level, one cannot 
doubt the conclusion: 
A full employment policy adjusting the growth of labour income to its 
full employment level stabilizes the economy by removing the “capacity of in-
flation”. 
Since a rise in the rate of interest out of monetary policy has a negative 
impact of consumption and thereby investment one may drive an important cor-
ollary: there is an inverse relationship between the rate of interest and the rate of 
capacity utilization. Thereby a rise in the rate of interest (drop) increases the j 
factor (decreases) measuring the capacity inflation. Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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2. The second cause is a long run growth of the unit cost of labour is induced by 
a growth rate of the money average wage greater than the growth rate of produc-
tivity. It could result from two factors: 
-an exogenous push for an excess growth rate of the money wage generated 
by Unions and Sate legislation. 
-the competition between firms to attract scarce labour as the economy con-
verged to full employment 
2.1 The first factor is to be strongly doubted for at least three reasons. In a 
services led economy Unions only survive in the hard core manufacture sec-
tor. Let us assume as suggested by Galbraith ( 1998 ) that the money wage in 
the hard industrial core lead the whole structure of wages and therefore the 
average wage rate. The Unions push story ignores that a full employment 
policy automatically pushes for increased investment and therefore for the 
embodiment of more and more technology-innovations in the stock of 
equipment. It is tantamount to the proposition that a full employment policy 
sustains the growth of productivity in the long run. The last reasons lies in 
the deep misunderstanding of the nature of household expectations and the 
role of the Unions as the “conscious or planning agency” of labour. They ask 
for money wage hikes if and only if they are certain that two conditions are 
met: on one side those hikes are required to attain the growth of income sus-
taining consumption expectations; on the other side they are to provide an 
increase in the real wage accounting for the expected growth of purchasing 
power. Herein is the explanation of the inexistence of any “monetary illu-
sion” for unions, the same being true for all other groups. Postulating mone-
tary illusion for household has been a dangerous mistake of the wage-led in-
flation school. It ignores the fact that, as shown by John K Galbraith 
(2007)behind the veil of the Market the modern monetary economy is a set 
of planning agencies striving to get the maximum information on each other 
and the State long run policy. Unions cannot ignore either the price identity 
leading firms own planning agencies or the State long run goals. The wage 
led inflationschool confused two propositions: 
-household do not directly determine the real wage rate which is true. 
-household, as soon as they are organized are indifferent to the real wage 
and do not take care of firms long run planning which is not true. 
 
It is therefore straightforward that the more the economy converges to full 
employment the less existence conditions of wages-hikes decreed by Unions 
vanish. On one side household rationing disappearing, the incentive for im-
posing wage-hikes is itself disappearing. On the other side Unions get the in-
formation that productivity growth attains its limit, which implies that wage-Alain Parguez 
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hikes have a vanishing positive impact through the growth of consumption 
on productivity. The conclusion is again straightforward: 
A long run full employment policy nullifies the first factor of the wage-
inflation. As long as the trade deficit is compensated in a floatable-exchange 
rate economy by the State deficit, the growth of consumption foreign goods 
at relative cheaper price strengthen the conclusion.  It engineers an auto-
matic rise for a given rate of growth of the money wage rate. It should be the 
final proof of both the necessity and the perfect feasibility of a full employ-
ment policy in the contemporary world economy.  
 
2.2  The scarcity factor is also to be strongly doubted in the modern mone-
tary economy. Why would firms planers increasingly bid up for labour 
through wage hikes while they must know that they can no more realize 
a significant increase in their rate of growth? The scarcity factor ignores 
that as the economy moves towards full employment firms obtain their 
maximum rate of utilization of available global capacity, herein lies a 
true “real supply constraint”. Ignoring the global capacity barrier hides 
again a postulated monetary illusion on behalf of firms which is indeed 
not germane to their very nature of real net worth accumulation, planers 
which explain as shown by 15.1 and 15.2 that they target ultimately real 
profits. 
 
II-C-4 The Giovannoni straight line and the underlying theory of inflation makes 
full sense of a crucial historical period : the famous stagflation of the seventies 
and the French case from the late seventies onwards. 
 
1.  The seventies are a perfect case study! The sharp fall in growth and the 
resulting rise in unemployment was the outcome of at least two reasons: 
-the succession of sharp shocks on expectations generated by to waves 
of oil hikes price and other raw material price. They sharply increased 
the “threat of uncertainty” the feeling that the future was unknowable. 
This dramatic change in firms expectations imposed a deep change in 
the investment function reflected by a drop in the growth rate of invest-
ment relative to the growth rate of consumption. Firms started to bet on 
excess-capacity and they strove to prevent it. 
-the expectations shock would not have been that dramatic had the gov-
ernment maintained a coherent long run policy aiming at full employ-
ment. Since the early seventies, before the oil shocks they already aban-
doned their long run commitments and macro-policy did not play any 
more its anchor role. The Nixon and Carter Administration  were ob-
sessed by inflation and the threat of inflation. Their chaotic ways could 
not provide guiding information leading to an optimistic future. Con-Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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trary to a dominant way, I think that getting rid of the ailing Bretton 
Woods system was a very sensible decision but the opportunity was lost! 
Elsewhere the situation was worse. Great Britain, France and Germany 
were already rejecting full employment for the very sake of maintaining 
a fixed exchange rate and a grossly over-valued one especially for 
Great-Britain and France. 
 
2.  The accelerated fall in growth rates had obviously a significant impact 
on the rate of equipment utilization which triggered the capacity-
inflation factor as firms desperately endeavoured to save their profits. 
On the other side, it is true that in the course of the period, there were 
waves of wage-hikes (especially in France, Great-Britain and USA) 
They were desperate attempts (some last resort effort) by Unions to 
compensate for the fall in real income resulting from lower growth and 
therefore save minimum there level of consumption. They failed be-
cause they could not raise consumption so strong was the change in ex-
pectations, the sole outcome was indeed income inflation because pro-
ductivity was frozen by the vanishing inducement to invest. 
Ultimately, the seventies prove that a wrong and widespread State policy 
caused “stagnation” as shown by Bliek and Parguez (2007-2008). From 
1983 onward, the French government planned what has been “disinfla-
tion” as a crucial part of his fixed exchange-rate strategy, fall in French 
relative prices was expected to promote exports. Cumulative Russian-
like shock therapy imposed a strong drop in the rate of capacity utiliza-
tion reflected by the accelerated rise in the effective rate of unemploy-
ment, its sensible proxy. There is an effective unemployment threshold, 
the exploitation threshold beyond which the labour unit cost is to col-
lapse. On one side firms may impose a fall in the growth rate of wage-
unit while raising productivity out of more effort imposed on labour for 
the sake of efficiency. Firms planners followed this strategy and tres-
passed the exploitation barrier because it was highly praised if not im-
posed by the government. Politicians had been convinced by “experts” 
of the necessity of raising the share of profits to raise profits, the official 
French broth to be deemed the Hayeko-Ricardo-Marxian French Way 
(HRMF) of dealing with the economy. With a n factor raising out of 
monetary policy, raising m* seemed to require a fall in the real wage ra-
tio to productivity and thereby a fall in the growth of w relative to the 
growth rate of productivity. Meanwhile the capacity inflation accelerated 
but it was much more compensated by the labour cost deflation, which 
explains the effective drop in inflation. Such an outcome does not falsify 
the price identity 15.3 and the Giovannoni relationship. Indeed the share 
of profits sharply increased during the Mitterrand era as n, the share of Alain Parguez 
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“Rentiers” rose, which reflects a dramatic collapse of the labour income 
share, the proof of increased exploitation (Ederer and Stockammer 
2007). 
 
It just proves that there are two ways of dealing with inflation:  
-The dynamic way! The State is committed to full employment which 
abolishes incentives to inflation 
-The deflation or poverty way!  The State plans the rise in effective un-
employment to force a drop in inflation out of an increase of poverty. 
The first way is obviously the role germane to a modern monetary econ-
omy. It is the golden path. Money is endowed with value by the creation 
of real wealth it engineers. It is tantamount to the proposition that the 
value of money is proportional to employment and therefore inversely 
related to the effective rate of unemployment.  
What is true inflation but the loss of value of the currency. In a dynamic 
economy value is correctly reflected by the long run growth of the price 
level. In a poverty-addicted economy, the forced drop in effective infla-
tion is the veil of a loss of value of the currency, some hard-core infla-
tion. 
 
The positive causal relationship expressed by 15.3 is therefore general in 
its explanation of true inflation. 
 
 
Conclusion :  
The State is the existence condition of a stable monetary economy. 
 
It has been proven that Governments have to target full employment as their 
priority and that they are perfectly free to do so.  The so-called constraints or 
barriers invoked by politicians (whatever their denomination) and economists ( 
whatever their orientation) do not exist at all. They are self imposed constraints, 
the dark progeny of deeply misunderstood self-interest of groups in power and, 
maybe more, blithe ignorance or misunderstanding of the core principle of the 
modern capitalist economy which is a pure monetary economy. On this funda-
mental question, Keynes was right but the “academic scribblers” he invoked are 
not just right wing “defunct economics”! Herein must be the provisional main 
conclusion of the theory of the monetary circuit: money exists to remove the 
absolute scarcity constraint for all groups; it exists to create the future out of to-
day expectations; it exists to remove once for all the older Robin Hood economy 
when what some got was lost by other. It can easily be proven that in the no 
Robin Hood economy, the so-called Pensions Horror cannot exist (Bliek and 
Parguez 2006). Pensions are paid by firms and the State as a part of their ongo-Money Creation, Employment and Economic Stability: The Monetary Theory of Unemployment… 
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ing expenditures realized by money creation. They generate an equal increase in 
consumption leading to a rise in aggregate gross income on which contributions 
and taxes are raised. Abstracting from dubious assumptions on the nightmare of 
an “aging population”, an excess of pensions-income over contributions and 
induced taxes is reflected according to the fundamental identity by an increase in 
firms net profits. 
Who could thereby doubt the conclusion: Finally it is true that the State 
is the existence last resort condition of the monetary economy but for the better 
or the worse. The State plays in harmony with the core principles like a true 
Maestro or it may play against them and the orchestra turns into an horrendous 
cacophony! 
 
List of Symbols 
 
Y  Net value added in money units 
C Consumption 
I Private  investment 




g Budget  deficit 
B Trade  deficit 
Dh Household  debt 
W  Wage bill (private) net of taxes 
P  Aggregate profits net of taxes 
R  Net interest income net of taxes 
n  Share of R in Y 
Sh  Household net savings 
Se  Firms net savings 
Sf Foreign  net  savings 
Sr  Rentiers net savings or banks net profit   
r*  Rate of profit (targeted) 
m*  Share of profits (targeted) 
a Average  labour  productivity 
L Real  employment 
w Money-wage  rate 
r  Price of domestic output (targeted) 
J  Capital losses induced by too low a rate of equipment utilization 
j  Ratio of J to real output 
z Exchange  rate 
U  Effective rate of unemployment 
U0  Zero effective rate of unemployment 
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